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Abstract
Bell’s theorem is purported to demonstrate the impossibility of a local “hidden vari-
able” theory underpinning quantum mechanics. It relies on the well-known assumption
of ‘locality’, and also on a little-examined assumption called ‘statistical independence’ (SI).
Violations of this assumption have variously been thought to suggest “backward causation”,
a “conspiracy” on the part of nature, or the denial of “free will”. It will be shown here that
these are spurious worries, and that denial of SI simply implies nonlocal correlation between
spacelike degrees of freedom. Lorentz-invariant theories in which SI does not hold are easily
constructed: two are exhibited here. It is conjectured, on this basis, that quantum-mechanical
phenomena may be modeled by a local theory after all.
1 Introduction
The violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality by quantum mechanics is commonly understood to
undermine the possibility of “local” hidden-variable theories, i.e., theories which either supple-
ment quantum mechanics with additional variables (e.g., actual particle positions in the Bohm
theory (4)(5)), or replace the quantum-mechanical description with something else entirely. This
“no-go” result is known as Bell’s theorem (1). The argument is essentially that the assumption
of a certain kind of locality – known as ‘Bell locality’, ‘factorizability’(12), ‘strong locality’(15),
or simply ‘locality’(1) – is a sufficient condition to derive the inequality, and the predictions of
quantum mechanics violate this inequality. (The locution “strong locality” suggests that there
are weaker forms of locality, and indeed it was shown by Jarrett (15) (16) and by Shimony (21)
that ‘strong locality’ is the conjunction of two weaker locality conditions, referred to by Shimony
as “outcome independence” and “parameter independence”.)
However, there is an additional, nontrivial assumption that goes into the Bell argument, and
this is the assumption of statistical independence (SI ). Its role in the derivation was understood
by Bell and others, but it has been little examined because it has for the most part been thought
to be beyond question, since violations of it have seemed to most to entail either violations of
“free will”, the possibility of “backward causation”, or some sort of cosmic conspiracy on the
part of nature. I will show that, to the contrary, violations of SI entail none of these, and I will
in fact offer in support of this contention two examples of classical, Lorentz-invariant theories
that violate SI.
The paper proceeds as follows
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• Section 2 rehearses the way in which the constraints of factorizability and statistical inde-
pendence come into the derivation of the Bell-CHSH inequality.
• Section 3 shows that SI entails that spacelike degrees of freedom are independent, and that
violation of SI implies that spacelike degrees of freedom are not independent (rendering
the term “degrees of freedom” something of a misnomer).
• In section 4, it is argued that violation of SI does not lead to problems with free-will,
backward causation, etc.
• In section 5, two examples of SI -violating theories are offered.
• In section 6, it is shown that in fact violation of SI leads naturally to the “contextuality”
(of the values of various degrees of freedom) demanded by the Kochen-Specker theorem.
• In section 7, we discuss future prospects for a theory with nonlocal constraints.
• Section 8 comprises some concluding remarks.
2 Bell’s theorem
The thought experiment at the core of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paper on the in-
completeness of quantum mechanics (11) involves a pair of particles in an entangled state of
position and momentum, a state which is an eigenstate of the quantum-mechanical operators
representing the sum of the momenta and the difference of the positions of the particles. Quan-
tum mechanics makes no definite predictions for the position and momentum of each particle,
but does make unequivocal predictions for the position or momentum of one, given (respectively)
the position or momentum of the other. EPR argued that this showed that quantum mechanics
must be incomplete, since measurement of the position (or momentum) of one particle could
not simultaneously give rise to a definite position (or momentum) of the other particle, on pain
of violation of locality. They concluded that quantum mechanics, because it did not assign a
position (or momentum) to the other particle beforehand, must be incomplete.1
Bohm’s streamlined version of the EPR experiment (3) involves the spins of a pair of particles
(either fermions or bosons) rather than their positions and momenta. Prepared in what has come
to be known as a “Bell” state,
ψ =
1√
2
(|+x〉A |−x〉B − |−x〉A |+x〉B), (1)
quantum mechanics predicts that a measurement of the component of spin of particle A in any
direction (e.g., zˆ) is as likely to yield +1 as −1 (in units of ~/2), and so the expectation value A¯
is 0. However, quantum mechanics also indicates that an outcome of +1 for a measurement of
the spin of A in the zˆ direction is guaranteed to yield an outcome of −1 for B for a measurement
of the spin of B in the zˆ direction. etc. This is directly analogous to the correlations between
position and momentum measurements in the original EPR experiment.
In and of themselves, these phenomena offer no barrier to a hidden-variable theory, since it
is straightforward to explain such correlations by appealing to a common cause – the source –
and postulating that the particles emanate from this source in (anti)correlated pairs. However,
1The argument of the EPR paper is notoriously convoluted, but I follow (13) in regarding this as capturing
Einstein’s understanding of the core argument.
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such an explanatory strategy must also account for the way that the anticorrelation drops off as
the angle between the components of spin for the two particles increases (e.g., as A rotates from
xˆ toward zˆ while B remains at xˆ). It was Bell’s great insight to note that the quantum theory
implies that the anticorrelation is held onto more tightly than could be accounted for by any
“local” theory. Bell showed that the predictions of a local theory must satisfy an inequality (a
precursor to the Bell-CHSH inequality below), and that this inequality is violated by quantum
theory for appropriate choices of the components of spin to be measured.
In order to understand the role of the locality assumption and the statistical independence
assumption, let us briefly review the derivation of the Bell-CHSH inequality. The physical
situation we are attempting to describe has the following form:
A source (represented by the ellipse) emits a pair of particles, or in some other way causes
detectors A and B to simultaneously (in some frame) register one of two outcomes. The detectors
can be set in one of two different ways, corresponding, in Bohm’s version of the EPR experiment,
to a measurement of one of two different components of spin.
Let us now suppose that we have a theory that describes possible states of the particles
by a discrete or continuous parameter λ, describing either a discrete set of states λ1, λ2... or a
continuous set. We will also suppose that the theory provides us with predictions for the average
value A¯(a, λ) and B¯(b, λ) of measurements of properties a and b at detector A and B in any
given state λ. (The appeal to average values allows for stochastic theories, in which a given λ
might give rise to any number of different outcomes, with various probabilities.) In general, one
might suppose that A¯ also depended on either the detector setting b or the particular outcome
B (i.e., A¯ = A¯(a, λ, b, B)) and similarly for B¯. That it does not, that the expectation value A¯
in a given state λ does not depend on what one chooses to measure at B, or on the value of the
distant outcome B (and vice-versa) is Bell’s locality assumption. Given this assumption, one
can write the expression E(a, b, λ) for the expected product of the outcomes of measurements
of properties a and b in a given state λ as
E(a, b, λ) = A¯(a, λ)B¯(b, λ). (2)
This condition is also known as ‘factorizability’, deriving as it does from the fact that the joint
probability of a pair of outcomes can be factorized into the product of the marginal probabilities
of each outcome. We can thus represent the analysis of the experimental arrangement in this
way:
Now, a theory that accounts for our observations will presumably do so in part by giving a
probability distribution P (λ) over the various possible states associated with a given “prepara-
tion” (a given set of circumstances in the region of the ellipse in the diagram above), and the
expected outcome E(a, b) will then be given by the weighted sum (we restrict to discrete λ for
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simplicity)
E(a, b) =
∑
λ
E(a, b, λ)P (λ|a, b) =
∑
λ
A¯(a, λ)B¯(b, λ)P (λ|a, b) (3)
where P (λ|a, b) is the probability of λ given detector settings a and b. Thus the expected value
for the product of a measurement of spin components a1 and b2 is
E(a1, b2) =
∑
λ
A¯(a1, λ)B¯(b2, λ)P (λ|a1, b2) , (4)
the sum of the products of the expected values of the outcome at A, the outcome at B in each
state λ (λ1, λ2, etc.), and the probability of that state. If the probability of λ is independent of
the detector settings a and b, then one can replace P (λ|a, b) with P (λ). This is the condition
known as Statistical Independence (SI ), and as we shall now see, it is crucial to the derivation
of Bell’s result
The Bell-CHSH inequality (6), is:
|E(a1, b1)− E(a1, b2)|+ |E(a2, b2) + E(a2, b1)| ≤ 2 . (5)
The beginning of the derivation goes as follows. First, write down the difference between
expectation values for pairs of settings 〈a1, b1〉 and 〈a1, b2〉 :
E(a1, b1)− E(a1, b2) =
∑
λ
A¯(a1, λ)B¯(b1, λ)P (λ|a1, b1)−
∑
λ
A¯(a1, λ)B¯(b2, λ)P (λ|a1, b2) (6)
Assuming that SI holds, we can rewrite this as
E(a1, b1)− E(a1, b2) =
∑
λ
A¯(a1, λ)B¯(b1, λ)P (λ)−
∑
λ
A¯(a1, λ)B¯(b2, λ)P (λ) (7)
The key step, which allows the introduction of E(a2, b2) and E(a2, b1), involves expanding this
as
E(a1, b1)− E(a1, b2) =
∑
λ
A¯(a1, λ)B¯(b1, λ)P (λ)(1± A¯(a2, λ)B¯(b2, λ))
−
∑
λ
A¯(a1, λ)B¯(b2, λ)P (λ)(1± A¯(a2, λ)B¯(b1, λ)) .
(8)
This then leads to (5) via rearrangement of terms and manipulation using the relations |x| |y| =
|xy| and |x+ y| ≤ |x|+ |y|. For our purposes, though, the crucial step is (7), in which essential
use is made of SI. If we were not to assume SI, then (7) would revert to (6) and we would have
to rewrite (8) as
E(a1, b1)− E(a1, b2) ?=
∑
λ
A¯(a1, λ)B¯(b1, λ)P (λ|a1, b1)(1± A¯(a2, λ)B¯(b2, λ))
−
∑
λ
A¯(a1, λ)B¯(b2, λ)P (λ|a1, b2)(1± A¯(a2, λ)B¯(b1, λ))
(9)
which is simply invalid, since the new terms need not sum to zero anymore. Nor, for that matter,
would they correspond to the desired E(a2, b2) and E(a2, b1). Thus without appeal to SI, there
is no way to introduce the other two expectation values and derive the inequality.
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Figure 1: EPR: Spacetime diagram
3 Statistical independence revisited
The assumption of SI has been called into question only infrequently, but when it has, the
critique has often been motivated by an appeal to the plausibility of Lorentz-invariant “backward
causation”, whereby the change of detector settings gives rise to effects which propagate along
or within the backward lightcone and thereby give rise to nontrivial initial correlations in the
particle properties encoded in λ (e.g., (8),(24), (19)). In this section, I will argue that this is
an inappropriate way to motivate the rejection of SI, and that its rejection instead involves a
relativistically nonproblematic commitment to nonlocal constraints on initial data.
Depicted in Figure 1 is a run in which the setting of A is changed from a1 to a2 while the
particles (or whatever it is that emanates from the source) are in flight.
The different colors subsequent to the arrival of the particles at the two detectors correspond
to distinct experimental outcomes.
Now a clear-thinking student of relativity should suspect that something is amiss with this
argument, since all deterministic theories in use today already sanction a form of backward cau-
sation, in that they allow both prediction and retrodiction. All special and general-relativistic
theories have a well-defined causal structure which makes no distinction, other than a conven-
tional one, between future and past. Specifying the physical properties (the Cauchy data) at
each point on either of the shaded surfaces suffices to determine the physical situation at E
(Figure 2). The future data determine the event E just as much as the past data. And given an
appropriate description of the future data—a description which adopts a “backward-directed”
temporal orientation—one can regard these data as the cause of the event E.2
Let us put aside any qualms we might have regarding the notion of backward causation for
the moment and examine the particular situation of the EPR-Bohm experiment more closely, in
the hope that this will shed some light. Suppose we simply temporally invert the situation above,
as in Figure 3. This looks like a pair of sources, A and B, emitting particles in the direction
2For example, we seek the cause of an explosion in the past, but if the very same event were described from
an inverted temporal perspective, described as an implosion, we would look in the opposite temporal direction.
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Figure 2: Past and future domains of dependence
Figure 3: EPR: Spacetime diagram with inverted time axis
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of a common destination. Is it not reasonable to expect that the “final” state λ = (λA,λB) is
correlated with the settings of the sources?
In fact, it is not. Suppose we know some, but not all, of the data in the past lightcone of
an event E. Suppose, for instance, that we know that the white region is empty of physically
significant data, and suppose we know the data in the red and blue ellipses, but not in the
turquoise ellipses indicated by question-marks:
In such a case, we know nothing more about what to expect at E than if we had no information
at all. Given the ability to choose data in the turquoise ellipsoids, we can make E whatever we
want.
But now suppose we fill in the unspecified ellipses:
Then we know data on a Cauchy slice of the past lightcone of E, and E is fully determined.
It is this situation that is the appropriate parallel of the time-reversed EPR experiment; the
newly-specified data correspond to the outcomes of the two trials.
Any plausibility that the particles might be causally correlated with the detector settings
derives from a situation in which the detectors themselves are the sources of the particles, rather
than mere conduits. In the EPR case, there are meaningful, (anti)correlated detection events,
and in the time-reversed picture these detection events serve as additional data, additional
sources. (One can move the slice so that it is prior to any outcome, but one will still have
to contend with the fact that only a complete specification of the physics inside the detector,
including the state of the particles, is sufficient to determine E.)
The upshot, then, is that postulating a correlation between detector settings and the initial
state λ (corresponding to E in the figure above) – i.e., dropping SI – amounts to postulating a
correlation between the detector settings and the particle properties at any given time. I.e., the
correlations are not causal – they are not brought about dynamically – but are properties of the
state at any instant. The role of dynamics in a proper theory describing quantum phenomena
is to enforce, not generate, such correlations. The challenge, as yet unmet, is to articulate the
constraint which encodes these correlations. In section 6, we will examine two theories with
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appropriately nonlocal constraints in order to develop intuition. But first, let us examine two
other problems which are purported to arise in the rejection of SI
4 Superdeterminism and free will
The idea that the rejection of SI involves not some dynamical process like “backward causation”
but rather some preexisting and persisting correlations between subsystems has been broached
before, under the terms ‘conspiracy theory’, ‘hyperdeterminism’, and ‘superdeterminism’. Bell
(2), Shimony (22), Lewis (18) and others have suggested that proposing a correlation between
detector settings and particle properties involves some sort of conspiracy on the part of nature.
This is frequently accompanied by the charge that the existence of such correlations is a threat
to “free will”. Let us address these worries.
4.1 Conspiracy
The idea that postulating a correlation between detector settings and particle properties involves
a “conspiracy” on the part of nature appears to derive from the idea that it amounts to postu-
lating that the initial conditions of nature have been set up in anticipation of our measurements.
It might be supposed, analogously, that every time I telephone my friend Jenny at 867-5309,
something – perhaps a cosmic ray – causes my message to be misdirected to the non-working
number 867-5308, so that I appear to live in a Kafkaesque world in which my efforts to contact
Jenny are forever stymied. This would appear to be a world in which nature, in the form of
particularly vicious initial conditions, conspires against me to the point where I am driven to
postulate that it is a law of nature that I cannot successfully contact Jenny (except, perhaps,
on her mobile phone). But according to the way the story is told, it is really just an accident
that I cannot successfully make contact. Similarly, the conspiracy theorist views the appeal to
a failure of SI in order to explain the strange correlations predicted by quantum theory as an
appeal to a vast conspiracy on the part of nature to set initial conditions in such a way as to
ensure that experiments come out in accord with the quantum-mechanical predictions, so that
every time I do an EPR experiment it just happens to be the case that the detectors are set in
a way appropriate to generate the observed correlations.
What the conspiracy theorist is in effect doing is supposing a non-lawlike suspension of SI.
That is, she is supposing that the laws of nature are ordinary, local, relativistic laws, without
any nonlocal constraints, but that the initial conditions are such that it happens to turn out
that the states of measuring apparatuses are nontrivially, and persistently, correlated with the
states of the particles they eventually interact with. The idea seems to be that, were the initial
conditions to have been somewhat different, the entire quantum-mechanical edifice would fall
apart. Certainly, this is a theoretical possibility, but not a very happy one, for two reasons.
Were one to maintain that the laws of nature are the ordinary classical ones, with no general,
nonlocal constraints, and that quantum mechanics is the result of a highly special set of initial
conditions, one would be foregoing the possibility of explaining the myriad phenomena accounted
for by quantum mechanics which have nothing to do with measurement, such as the stability
of matter or the black-body emission spectrum. Although a theory that purports to account
for the full spectrum of quantum phenomena in a way that does not violate Bell’s locality
assumptions must specify nontrivial correlations between spacelike degrees of freedom, it cannot
do just that. Rather, the constraints in an SI -violating theory must account for the full range
of phenomena accounted for by quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. Thus a truly
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useful and predictive theory underpinning quantum phenomena is highly unlikely to have the
ad hoc character which concerns the conspiracy theorist.
4.2 Free will
Another worry about giving up SI and postulating generic nonlocal, spacelike correlations has
to do with a purported threat to our “free will”. This particular concern has been the subject
of renewed debate in the last couple of years, prompted in part by an argument of Conway
& Kochen (7). The core of the worry is that if detector settings are correlated with particle
properties, this must mean that we cannot “freely choose” the detector settings. This worry,
however, appears to be based on a conception of free will which is incompatible with ordinary
determinism, as pointed out by ’t Hooft (25). Why is it any more of a threat to free will to
have our “actions” correlated with other degrees of freedom than it is to have our actions be
determined by the events in our past? (Conway and Kochen bite the bullet and argue that
even ordinary determinism is incompatible with free will.)
One might conceivably make the case that ordinary deterministic theories are fine in a way
that superdeterministic theories, with their nonlocal constraints, are not by arguing that, in
allowing that our actions are determined by the past, we are simply granting that our actions
arise from our own thoughts and inclinations. This (limited) sort of determination is actually
essential for free choice. This perspective is a version of what is called ‘compatibilism’ in
philosophy, the view that freedom of the will is compatible with determinism (14).
A problem for free will would then arise if it were the case that the nonlocal correlations as-
sociated with an underlying superdeterministic theory somehow prevented an agent from acting
on its thoughts and inclinations. This is to say that the physical object identified as the “agent”
would exhibit behavior not explicable in terms of the influences on or in its past lightcone.
But this is not what is being contemplated here, for this would involve non-Lorentz-invariant
dynamics. What is at issue are Lorentz-invariant theories with nonlocal constraints.
5 Theories with nonlocal constraints: two examples
Theories which have constraints on initial data can be divided into two kinds, local and nonlocal.
The gauge field theories of the standard model are local, in that the constraint may be expressed
as a local condition, for example ∇ · E = 0, the Gauss law (in vacuo). The locality of the
constraint means that specifying the field at every point outside of an open set surrounding a
point x does not constrain the value of the field at x. Rather, the field in the neighborhood of
a point is constrained only by the field at the point.
Theories with nonlocal constraints are less familiar. These are theories in which specifying
the value of a field outside the neighborhood of a point x constrains the field at x. We will now
consider two examples of such theories.
5.1 Timelike Cauchy surfaces
Consider the theory of the massless scalar field, given by the wave equation φ = 0. In two
space dimensions, this reads (
∂2
∂x21
+
∂2
∂x22
− 1
c2
∂2
∂t2
)
φ = 0 (10)
9
where φ(x, t) is a twice-differentiable, real-valued field on spacetime. It is well-known that the
Cauchy problem is well-posed, meaning that specifying the field φ(x) and its normal derivative
∂φ(x)/∂t on a spacelike hyperplane t = 0 uniquely fixes the field at all other times. More
important, it is also the case that a solution exists for any such data, meaning that the field and
its time rate-of-change at each point are independently specifiable. Thus the ordinary initial
value formulation of the wave equation has no constraints, either local or nonlocal.
On the other hand one can also specify initial data on a mixed (spacelike and timelike)
hyperplane (17).3 Given data φ(x1, t) and ∂φ(x1, t)/∂x2 on the hyperplane x2 = 0, the data
uniquely determine the solution, if a solution exists at all for that data. The fact that solutions
do not exist for arbitrary data (except in the case of one space dimension) means that, as
formulated, the initial value problem is not “well-posed.” However, it has recently been shown
(10) that, just as in a gauge theory, one may write down a constraint on the initial data such
that any initial data satisfying the constraint lead to a unique, stable solution of the equation.
The resulting problem is well-posed.
The difference between this constraint and the gauge-theoretic constraint is that the former
is nonlocal while the latter is local. Specifically, the Cauchy data is given by functions f and g
such that
f(x1, t) := φ(x1, 0, t) =
∫
k21≥ω2
f˜(k1, ω)ei(k1x1−ωt)dk1dω (11)
g(x1, t) :=
∂φ(x1, 0, t)
∂x2
=
∫
k21≥ω2
g˜(k1, ω)ei(k1x1−ωt)dk1dω
where f˜ and g˜ are smooth functions of k1 and ω, related to f and g by the Fourier transform.
The functions f and g therefore cannot have compact support (though they may be chosen so
as to have arbitrarily small tails outside of a finite region).
The upshot of this example is that the ordinary theory of the massless scalar field, formulated
in terms of states specified on mixed spacelike and timelike hypersurfaces, is one in which a
natural generalization of SI to the case of fields (rather than particle states and detector settings)
is violated. I.e., the natural analogue of P (λ|a, b) = P (λ) does not hold. For example, consider
disjoint compact regions A, B and Λ on the initial data surface. Let λ = (f(Λ), g(Λ)) represent
the state the field in Λ, and let a = (f(A), g(A)) and b = (f(B), g(B)) represent the detector
settings a and b. Then it is the case that, given a generic probability distribution on the space
of initial data f and g, the probability of λ (the restriction of f and g to region Λ) will not be
independent of a and b. For example, if the functions f and g vanish in the regions A and B,
then it must be the case that they vanish in Λ (otherwise Λ would be a region in which f and
g have compact support, which we know not to be the case).
Note that, despite the failure of SI in this context, we have perfectly a well-posed initial
value problem, and we even have compact domains of dependence (see Figure 4). Here, data in
R determines data in the region out to E. The nonlocal constraint simply means that data in
R may not be specified freely.
5.2 Timelike compactification
Consider once more the wave equation, this time in one space dimension (for simplicity). And
consider again the initial value problem, but on an ordinary spacelike hyperplane. However,
3These mixed hypersurfaces are sometimes called “timelike” (17) or “non-spacelike” (9).
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Figure 4: Compact timelike domain of dependence
suppose that the spacetime on which the field takes values is compactified in the time direction,
so that the entirety forms a cylinder (see Figure 5). This, too, is an example of a theory whose
initial value formulation possesses a nonlocal constraint.
The reason for the constraint is of course that the solutions must be periodic. Whereas in
the ordinary initial value problem, initial data may be any smooth functions f(x) = φ(x, 0) and
g(x) = φ˙(x, 0), we now require that φ(x, 0) = φ(x, T ) and φ˙(x, 0) = φ˙(x, T ), where T is the
circumference of the cylinder. Solutions to the wave equation can be written as sums of plane
waves, with Fourier space representation
φˆ(k, t) = Fˆ (k)e−ikt + Gˆ(k)eikt , (12)
Since these plane waves must have period T (in the preferred frame dictated by the cylinder),
Figure 5: Timelike compactification
11
we have a constraint k = 2pinT (where n is a positive or negative integer), so that initial data are
no longer arbitrary smooth functions of k
φˆ(k, 0) = Fˆ (k) + Gˆ(k)
φˆt(k, 0) = −ik(Fˆ (k)− Gˆ(k))
but are rather constrained by the requirement k = 2pinT . Thus the initial data are the functions
φ(x, 0) =
1√
T
∞∑
n=−∞
φˆ(
2pin
T
, 0)ei
2pin
T
xdk
φt(x, 0) =
1√
T
∞∑
n=−∞
φˆt(
2pin
T
, 0)ei
2pin
T
xdk
i.e., they consist of arbitrary sums of plane waves with wave number k = 2pinT .
The restriction to a discrete (though infinite) set of plane waves means that initial data do
not have compact support; they are periodic in both space and time. Thus, as in the case of the
mixed initial value problem, the data cannot be specified freely. However, for sufficiently large T
or sufficiently small ∆x, the local physics is indistinguishable from the local physics in ordinary
Minkowski spacetime. Only at distance scales on the order of T does the compact nature of the
direction become evident in the repetition of the spatial structure.
6 Contextuality
The Kochen-Specker theorem points toward a kind of contextuality in quantum mechanics, and
indeed in any theory in which the properties of a system are understood to be independent of
the properties of other systems. The theorem shows that, for systems described by quantum
mechanics, the properties of these systems cannot consistently be assigned values if the values
respect a certain seemingly natural criterion called ‘functional composition’ (20). Functional
composition is the assumption that the value v(AˆBˆ) of an observable AˆBˆ which is the product
of commuting observables Aˆ and Bˆ is equivalent to the product v(Aˆ)v(Bˆ) of the values of each
observable, as long as the observables commute. Given this assumption, one can show that
the following set of operators, representing spin observables for a system composed of two spin-
1/2 particles, cannot simultaneously be assigned values in a way that is consistent with the
requirement that the values belong to the eigenvalue spectrum of the operators
I ⊗ σˆz σˆz ⊗ I σˆz ⊗ σˆz
σˆx ⊗ I I ⊗ σˆx σˆx ⊗ σˆx
σˆx ⊗ σˆz σˆz ⊗ σˆx σˆy ⊗ σˆy .
(13)
Rather, the value assigned to a given observable must depend on whether it is being measured
along with the other (commuting) observables in its row, or the other observables in its column.
Recent work on generalizing the Kochen-Specker result to any theory admitting an oper-
ational characterization shows that there is a sense in which any theory that reproduces the
predictions of quantum mechanics must be contextual (23). Without going into unnecessary
detail, the general idea is that any theory reproducing the predictions of quantum theory must
be such that the probabilities for various outcomes must in general depend on which other prop-
erties are (simultaneously) measured. Such a result, however, is utterly unsurprising in a theory
with nonlocal constraints, so long as one recognizes that the detector orientations themselves
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are part of the system, since the nonlocal constraint means that the degrees of freedom of the
detectors are not independent of those describing the particles. Indeed, from a non-operational,
closed-system point of view, one may view the contextuality implicit in the Kochen-Specker
theorem as implying the existence of a nonlocal constraint. This sheds light on the relationship
between Bell’s theorem and the Kochen-Specker theorem, in that K-S essentially shows that
any local hidden-variable theory must violate statistical independence, while Bell shows that
any statistically independent theory must violate locality.
7 Future directions
Neither of the two examples above, examples of theories with nonlocal constraints, appear to
have any direct connection to quantum mechanics, though the mixed initial value problem might
be so related. It is certainly worth investigating what sort of theory emerges if one takes, for
example, the wave equation on three space and two time dimensions (called an ‘ultrahyperbolic’
equation) and considers data on an initial Cauchy surface of 3+1 dimensions. Such a theory will
also have nonlocal constraints, and might give rise to interesting behavior when the extra time
dimension is averaged over in such a way as to generate an effective theory in 3 + 1 spacetime
dimensions. The obvious difficulty is that, if the extra time dimension is not compact, there may
be no obvious choice of measure over which to average.
Perhaps more intriguingly, one might ponder the way in which the ordinarily superfluous
gauge degrees of freedom of modern gauge theories might serve as nonlocal hidden variables.
The vector potential in electrodynamics, for example, ordinarily plays no direct physical role:
only derivatives of the vector potential, which give rise to the electric and magnetic fields,
correspond to physical “degrees of freedom” in classical and quantum electrodynamics. The
Aharonov-Bohm effect shows that the vector potential does play an essential role in the quantum
theory, but the effect is still gauge-invariant.4 One might nevertheless conjecture that there is
an underlying theory in which the potential does play a physical role, one in which the physics
is not invariant under gauge transformations.5 The indeterminacy we associate with quantum
theory may then arise via epistemic limitations. More specifically, it may be impossible for us
to directly observe the vector potential, and the uncertainties associated with quantum theory
may arise from our ignorance as to its actual (and nonlocally constrained) value. From this
perspective,quantum theory would be an effective theory which arises from modding out over
the gauge transformations.
Finally, recent work on decoherence and the emergence of classicality (26) suggests that the
emergence of classicality requires very special quantum states. For worlds with a large number
of subsystems, hence a high Hilbert space dimension, only a measure zero subset of the total set
of quantum states gives rise to distinctively classical behavior. Thus it seems quite reasonable
to suppose a similarly strong constraint on the states of a hidden-variable theory.
4One might also ponder the connection with the closely related way in which energy enters into classical,
nongravitational physics. In the absence of gravity, only differences in energy are held to be observable, but
when gravity enters the picture, absolute values of energy are understood to be relevant. Or course, this in turn
leads to the cosmological constant problem when one attempts to couple a quantum theory of matter to classical
gravitation.
5’t Hooft has also gestured in this direction - see (25), p. 7.
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8 Conclusion
The ideas sketched in the previous section are preliminary, of course, and they are only two of
many possible ways to construct theories which feature nonlocal constraints. What the reader
should take away from this paper, if nothing else, is the idea that it is not all that difficult to
construct nonlocal theories which nevertheless local in the sense of being Lorentz-invariant and
not allowing superluminal signaling, and that such theories are quite promising as deterministic
or stochastic models of many of the curious phenomena described by quantum mechanics.
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